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Introduction
An institution may be considered as systemically important if its failure or mal-
function causes widespread distress, either as a direct or indirect impact (i.e. 
contagion), where the main criterion for assessing systemic importance relates to 
their potential to have a large negative impact on the financial system and the real 
economy (imf et al. ,2009).
Defining whether a financial institution1 is systemically important or not may 
be decidedly intricate but key to the oversight, supervision and regulation of the 
financial system. To be able to identify systemic importance may serve the purpo-
se of assisting financial authorities in focusing their attention and resources –the 
intensity of oversight, supervision and regulation- where the systemic severity 
resulting from a financial institution failing or near-failing is estimated to be the 
greatest. Identifying systemically important institutions may also serve financial 
authorities for enhanced policy-making (e.g. prudential regulation, oversight and 
supervision) and decision-making (e.g. resolving, restructuring or providing emer-
gency liquidity). 
Literature has acknowledged the existence of three key criteria for assessing and 
identifying the systemic importance of financial institutions: size, connectedness 
and substitutability (imf et al., 2009; Manning et al., 2009). According to imf et al. 
(2009), it is possible to relate size and non-substitutability to the direct impact of 
an institution failing to fulfill its role within the financial markets, whilst connec-
tedness relates to the indirect impact of such event. 
Despite the intuitiveness of these concepts, assessing and identifying systemic 
important institutions remain a non-trivial task that implies several challenges. Two 
1 For this document the authors embrace the term “financial institution” as comprising de-
pository institutions (e.g. banks or savings associations), brokers, dealers, investment companies 
(e.g. mutual funds), insurance companies, investment advisers and credit unions; this is, those 
that may not be regarded as a “financial market utility”, where the latter is defined as in the 2010 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: “any person that manages or oper-
ates a multilateral system for the purpose of transferring, clearing or settling payments, securities, 
or other financial transactions among financial institutions or between financial institutions and 
the person”. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereafter 
Dodd-Frank Act) is United States of America’s legislative response to the most recent episode 
of international financial crisis. Its main objective is to promote financial stability of the United 
States, whereas Section 804 of the Act addresses the main considerations to designate what sys-
temic importance is. 
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challenges are particularly demanding. First, designing metrics for connectedness 
and substitutability may require, as acknowledged by recent literature, non-standard 
data sources and techniques, such as financial infrastructures’ data and network 
theory, respectively. Second, choosing a methodology capable of robustly aggre-
gating the metrics designed for the three aforementioned concepts into a systemic 
importance index may be intricate.  
A consultative document by the bis - Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
introduced an early approach to both challenges (bcbs-bis, 2011). Regarding the 
first challenge, the proposal relies mainly on traditional balance sheet data, against 
growing agreement on the convenience of using other data sources and technical 
approaches (Uribe, 2011a,b; León et al., 2011; ecb, 2010). About the second cha-
llenge, somewhat divergent from imf et al. (2009) concerns and suggestions, the 
proposal employs an equal and fixed weighting scheme for aggregating five key 
indicators (i.e. each one assigned a 20% weight), where the relevance of each key 
indicator does not seem to follow any technique –quantitative or qualitative2. An 
equal and fixed weighted scheme does not allow quantifying the relative impor-
tance of each different characteristic into the systemic importance of financial 
institutions.    
Unlike the bcbs-bis (2011) proposal, León and Machado (2013) tackle the first 
challenge by using balance sheet data and an application of network theory to the 
large-value payment system’s data. They design four inputs or metrics for asses-
sing size, connectedness and substitutability for the Colombian financial system. 
Size is captured via the volume of deposits and money market borrowing, and 
the volume of financial assets under management. Connectedness is captured by 
measuring the contribution of each institution to the number and volume of the 
large-value payment system’s transactions. Substitutability is captured by measu-
ring the betweeness centrality (i.e. the brokerage role) of each institution within 
the large-value payment system’s network of transactions. 
Regarding the second challenge, León and Machado (2013) employ Fuzzy Lo-
gic, an Engineering-type approach based on the deconstruction of expert knowledge 
into a method that imitates the way experts themselves think about the decision 
process regarding what a systemically important financial institution is. Despite 
2 Other drawbacks of the bcbs-bis (2011) methodological proposal are briefly discussed in 
León and Machado (2013), especially regarding the convenience of considering expert judgment 
as a key input for deciding the weighting scheme. Other comments to the consultative document 
are posted in the bis’ webpage (http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs201/cacomments.htm).  
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its advantages, such as capturing non-linearities in the aggregation of key indica-
tors and incorporating imf et al. (2009) recommendations about the importance of 
expert judgment and qualitative inputs, the significance of each input or metric 
is not tested (i.e. relies on expert knowledge), whilst the weight assigned to each 
input or metric is non-observable.
In order to overcome some of the drawbacks of both proposals regarding the se-
cond challenge (i.e. the aggregation of key indicators), the herein paper implements 
Principal Components Analysis (pca) on León and Machado (2013) aforementioned 
four inputs for size, connectedness and substitutability for the Colombian financial 
market. Therefore, the purpose of this implementation is twofold: (i) identifying 
how significant those inputs are for differentiating the relative systemic importan-
ce for Colombian financial institutions, and (ii) obtaining an alternative Systemic 
Importance Index with observable but non-arbitrary weights. 
Results confirm that (i) the three concepts and their metrics are explanatory and 
non-redundant for differentiating financial institutions’ relative systemic impor-
tance; (ii) connectedness is the single most important input, followed by size and 
substitutability, in that order; (iii) Commercial Banks are the most systemically 
important financial institution in the Colombian case; (iv) some local non-banking 
institutions (i.e. Brokerage Firms), despite being insignificant by the balance sheet 
exposure they engender, are systemically important because of their role within 
the local financial system. 
The document is structured as follows: based on León and Machado (2013), 
the next section briefly introduces the systemic importance concept. The second 
section introduces pca basics and documents its application to related studies. The 
third section presents some aggregated results for the Colombian case based on 
information available from financial institutions participating in the local large-
value payment system (cud) 3 as of May, June and July 2011. Based on the aggre-
gated results, the fourth section exhibits the systemic importance assessment for 
Colombian financial institutions. The fifth section presents some final remarks. An 
exhibit provides further information about some of the methodological approaches 
herein implemented for assessing connectedness and substitutability. 
3 Colombia’s large-value payment system (cud) is a direct participation system where any fi-
nancial institution can maintain deposits and conduct transactions with other participants without 
the need for an agent or intermediary. During the three months comprising the analysis (May, June, 
July 2011) about 147 financial institutions made transactions within the cud.  
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1. Systemic risk and systemic importance4
As presented by imf et al. (2009), G20 countries embrace the following general de-
finition of systemic risk: the risk of disruption of financial services that (i) is caused 
by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential 
to have serious negative consequences for the real economy. Regarding payment 
systems, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (cpss-bis, 2011) de-
fine it as the risk that the inability of a financial institution to meet its obligations 
could result in the inability of other system participants or of financial institutions 
in other parts of the financial system to meet their obligations as they become due.
Irrespective of which of these definitions is embraced, and despite there is not 
a  single definition of risk that can be completely satisfactory in every situation 
(Dowd, 2005)5, it is common to think of risk as a function based on two parame-
ters: frequency and severity (Condamin et al., 2006), also referred as likelihood 
and impact, respectively (Gallati, 2003). Although academic effort has traditio-
nally focused on systemic concerns based on the estimation of systemic risk (i.e. 
the product of frequency and impact, as in Norman et al. (2009)), there is a recent 
interest in focusing on systemic severity or importance.6  
For example, Paul Tucker, Executive Director for Markets and member of the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, pointed out the following 
(Tucker, 2005): 
[T]he interesting question is not whether or not risk will crystallize, as in one form or 
another risks crystallize every day. Rather, the important question is whether, in the event 
of nasty shocks, our capital markets can absorb them or whether they have developed 
characteristics which may, as some suggest, leave them vulnerable.
4 This section is transcribed from León and Machado (2013).
5 A proper definition of risk is beyond the aim of this paper. Interesting reviews of risk defini-
tions and their implications can be found in Hubbard (2009). 
6 Some authors (Rebonato, 2007; Taleb, 2007) argue that models and techniques for estimating 
very low probabilities of very disastrous occurrences have demonstrated to yield poor results, and 
even question the usefulness of those models and techniques for capturing extreme adverse events 
not found in historical data. Rebonato (2007) also questions the convenience of regulators using 
VaR-type approaches (i.e. based on estimating low probabilities) to determine prudential capital 
since even a high percentile (e.g. 99%) would allow a firm to incur losses equal to its regulatory 
capital rather often (i.e. 2-3 times a year); not to mention if extreme losses cluster, as they do.    
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More recently, as a result of the most recent episode of global financial crisis, 
the consultative report “Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures” published 
by the Bank of International Settlements’ Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems (cpss-bis, 2011) includes several principles that aim to provide a high de-
gree of confidence that a financial market infrastructure will continue operating and 
serve as a source of financial stability even in extreme market conditions. Princi-
ples 4 and 7 emphasize the importance of focusing on the severity of the systemic 
shocks; the latter addresses liquidity risk for financial market infrastructures: 
Principle 7 (Liquidity Risk): A financial market infrastructure should maintain sufficient 
liquid resources to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday settlement of pay-
ment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of potential stress 
scenarios that should include, but not be limited to, the default of [one/two] participant[s] 
and [its/their] affiliates that would generate the largest aggregate liquidity need in ex-
treme but plausible market conditions.
Such increasing interest in the impact of systemic shocks –beyond the interest 
in their frequency- results from the intrinsic characteristics of the financial and 
payments systems. As pointed out by Haldane (2009) and León et al. (2011), fi-
nancial and payments networks nowadays may be described as robust to random 
disturbances, but highly susceptible to targeted attacks.7 This results from the sys-
temic importance of financial institutions (e.g. size, connectedness, substitutability) 
being distributed with a high degree of asymmetry (right skew) and excess kurtosis, 
where the average institution is of low systemic importance (Figure 1, upper panel) 
and the average default or failure-to-pay results in low systemic severity (Figure 1, 
lower panel); correspondingly, systemically important institutions and their con-
sequent high systemic severities lurk in the extreme right tail of the distributions. 
7 As mentioned by Haldane (2009), this explains why there exist long periods of apparent ro-
bustness, where peripheral –not systemically important- nodes are subject to random shocks, and 
short but severe episodes of systemic distress, where systemically important institutions endanger 
financial stability. Therefore Haldane’s characterization of the current international financial net-
work: “robust-yet-fragile”. 
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Figure 1. systemic importance and systemic severity
Source: León and Machado (2013). 
This means that traditional focus on estimating systemic risk as the sum of 
multiplying each participant’s estimated frequency of failure (or near failure) 
times its corresponding estimated impact may be dangerously diverting finan-
cial authorities from its aim of ever preserving financial stability and payment 
systems safety: on average the financial stability and payments system’s safety 
may be “guaranteed”, but not when confronted with a systemically important 
participant failing. This is, focusing on estimating probabilities of systemic events 
happening would mean preparing (i.e. overseeing, supervising, regulating) for 
a severe systemic shock based on the impact of a single –systemically modest- 
average institution.
Moreover, estimating systemic risk as the sum of multiplying each participant’s 
estimated frequency of failure (or near failure) times its corresponding estimated 
impact assumes that failures or near failures by different participants do not co-
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me together (i.e. they are independent).8 As recently exhibited by the concurrent 
episodes of distress of aig, Lehman and Bear Sterns, such independence is by no 
means guaranteed.
Therefore, as financial authorities should be prepared to confront a non-average 
but extreme threat to financial stability or payment systems’ safety, the supervision, 
oversight and regulation should be designed to cope with one (or even two) sys-
temically important institution(s) failing or near failing, as suggested by cpss-bis 
(2011) when formulating Principles 4 and 7 for measuring, monitoring and mana-
ging credit and liquidity risks for financial infrastructures. In this sense, financial 
authorities’ prudential supervision, regulation and oversight (i.e. policy-making) 
and decision-making rely on defining what systemic importance is, and identifying 
institutions that comply with such definition.  
According to imf et al. (2009), G-20 members state that an institution may be 
considered as systemically important if its failure or malfunction causes wides-
pread distress, either as a direct or indirect impact (i.e. contagion), where the main 
criterion for assessing systemic importance relates to their potential to have a large 
negative impact on the financial system and the real economy. This overall criterion 
may be conveniently explained by three more concise criteria: size, connectedness 
and substitutability (imf et al., 2009; Manning et al., 2009). 
Designing metrics which capture these criteria is complex and pertains to an 
ongoing debate. The authors’ choice of metrics follows recent literature (Uribe, 
2011a,b; León et al., 2011; ecb, 2010) about the convenience of using new data 
sources and techniques for measuring size, connectedness and substitutability.
1.1. Size 
Some authors regard an institution as systemically important when exceeding an 
asset-size cutoff (Saunders et al., 2009), whilst others (imf et al., 2009) prefer to 
gauge the amount of financial services it provides to the system. This is the tra-
ditional approach to systemic risk, where the systemic importance of a financial 
8 When estimating market risk this inconvenience is absent: it is impossible that two (or 
more) scenarios crystallize; there is a unique outcome (i.e. if return resulted to be 1.2% all other 
realizations are impossible), thus assuming independence of each realization is appropriate. For 
estimating systemic or credit risk, where simultaneous occurrence of outcomes is feasible (e.g. 
several firms may enter into default simultaneously or within a short period), this assumption may 
be inappropriate.     
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institution generally increases with its size, where systemically important institu-
tions are labeled as too-big-to-fail. 
When considering the amount of financial services provided to the system as the 
metric for size some intuitive and straightforward key indicators emerge. Because 
they belong to the traditional institution-centric approach to micro-prudential su-
pervision, standard accounting data already contains relevant information, such as 
balance and off-balance sheet exposures (e.g. deposits, money market borrowing 
and lending) and volume of assets it warehouses or manages, etc.. Other relevant 
size indicators such as the volume of payments by individual institutions are not 
publicly disclosed, but are available for financial authorities via their involvement 
in large-value payment systems or via their oversight and supervision duties.   
1.2. Connectedness 
According to the European Central Bank (2010) the properties and behavior of an 
institution may be affected by institutions that have links to it, and also by other 
institutions that have no direct links, but are linked to its neighbors. Therefore, the 
larger the number –and volume- of the links an institution maintains with other 
market participants, the larger the contagion or spillovers it may generate; this 
is, the systemic importance of a financial institution generally increases with its 
degree of connectedness. Despite its intuitiveness this is a rather novel approach 
to systemic risk, where systemically important institutions are labeled as too-
connected-to-fail (León et al., 2011; Machado et al. 2010; Chan-Lau, 2010; ecb, 
2010; Clark, 2010; Zhou, 2009). 
Unlike financial institutions’ size, connectedness may be intricate to assess, with 
regulators and central banks currently lacking the resources to carry out this kind 
of analysis (Clark, 2010). Network theory9 provides some concepts and metrics 
that may assist the assessment of connectedness. The most simple concept is the 
9 Network theory (also referred as network topology or analysis) is a method used in Statistical 
Physics to understand and analyze the structure and functioning of complex networks. As acknowl-
edged in authors’ prior works (León and Machado, 2013; León et al., 2011; Machado et al., 2010), 
network theory provides appealing methods and techniques to cope with the need to change from 
an institution-centric to a systemic approach. The studies by Soramäki et al. (2006) and Bech and 
Garrat (2006) use network theory to characterize the United States (Fedwire) payment system, 
while Ianoka et al. (2004) apply it to the Japan case (BoJ-Net). Cepeda (2008) applies network 
theory to the Colombian large-value payment system (cud) to quantify the impact of failures on 
its stability.
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in-degree and out-degree centrality, which refer to the number of “neighbors” or 
“partners” an institution has within the network, where the former (latter) corres-
ponds to incoming (outgoing) flows. 
Traditional application of network theory for assessing systemic risk relies on 
balance sheet data such as interbank funding and lending, as in Garrat et al. (2011) 
or Chan-Lau (2010). Alternatively León and Machado (2013), León et al. (2011) 
and Machado et al. (2010) use large-value payment system’s databases. The choice 
of connectedness metric and of data source (i.e. balance sheet or large-value pay-
ment system) will be addressed in the third section. For more details, see Exhibit A. 
1.3. Substitutability 
If the absence of a financial institution distorts the system because it is difficult (or 
impossible) to find another institution able to provide the same (or similar) type 
and volume of financial services (e.g. settlement, payments, interbank lending, 
custody, brokerage), such institution is systemically important. As pointed out by 
Manning et al. (2009), the severity of the impact of a payment system failure, and 
hence the extent of systemic risk, depends critically on whether substitutes are 
readily available to allow payment flows to be rerouted via another system. Con-
sequently, the systemic importance of a financial institution generally decreases 
with its degree of substitutability, where connectedness and substitutability are 
both related to the too-connected-to-fail criteria.
Unlike financial institutions’ size, the degree of substitutability may be intricate 
to assess. Despite there being cases in which it is easy to determine that a parti-
cipant or infrastructure is non-substitutable (e.g. if there is a sole infrastructure 
in charge of all the market’s clearing), it may be cumbersome to determine other 
participants’ degree of non-substitutability. 
For these cases network theory provides some concepts and metrics that may 
assist the assessment of substitutability. An interesting concept is betweenness 
centrality (Newman, 2010 and 2003; Buechel and Buskens, 2008; de Nooy et al., 
2005), which is a measure of a network’s resilience based on the assessment of 
the involvement of a participant in the indirect connection of all other participants. 
As with connectedness, network theory for assessing substitutability could 
rely on data gathered from institutions’ balance sheets (e.g. interbank funding and 
lending) or from large-value payment systems. The choice of substitutability me-
tric and of data source (i.e. balance sheet or large-value payment system) will be 
addressed in the third section.       
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2. pca basics and related applications
As previously illustrated, the characteristics that literature has identified as key 
determinants of systemic importance are financial institutions’ size, connectedness 
and substitutability. Nevertheless, two main complications may be faced when 
calculating a measure associated to systemic importance of financial institutions. 
The first one consists of obtaining an appropriate measure of each dimension of 
the problem; this is how to gauge the main characteristics or properties of the sys-
tem. The second one is related to how to weight these characteristics in order to 
construct an aggregate indicator, where this indicator may be used as a measure of 
systemic importance of different financial institutions. Because the first issue has 
been already addressed when choosing León and Machado (2013) metrics, this 
section addresses the second complication.
In Economics and many other fields it is quite common to deal with a set of 
possible correlated variables and observations. The main problem emerges when 
trying to summarize the common information assigning an appropriate weight for 
each of the variables. 
The case in hand is no exception since we have four characteristics (metrics) 
related to systemic importance for a set of financial institutions, and the weighting 
scheme is unknown. Therefore, the main objective is to construct a consolidated 
measure of systemic importance taking into account the chosen set of characte-
ristics. As illustrated below, this general concern has been present in many fields 
and sciences, and a common solution has been the use of Principal Components 
Analysis (pca).
The basic intuition of this methodology consists of summarizing the informa-
tion contained in a large number of correlated variables into a new set of variables, 
much smaller than the former one, named the “principal components”. Those com-
ponents represent a linear combination of an uncorrelated set of the characteristics 
in an ordered manner. The first principal component retains most of the common 
variation in all the original variables.  
Campbell et al. (1997) describe pca as a technique that permits the reduction 
of the number of variables being analyzed without losing too much information in 
the covariance matrix. Our objective is to reduce the dimension form of n systemic 
characteristics of financial institutions into K factors. The principal components 
serve as these factors. According to this, the first principal component corresponds 
to the linear combination of these systemic characteristics with maximum varian-
ce, and the second principal component represents the linear combination of the 
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systemic characteristics with maximum variance of all combinations orthogonal 
to the first principal component. 
Using the exposition of this methodology presented in Campbell et al. (1997), the 
first principal component corresponds to x*'1 Rt x*1 where the vector x*'1 Rt x*1 of size (N×1) is the 
solution to the following problem:
Max
x1 x'1Ωx1                  (1)
x'1x1 = 1                  (2)
Ω
subject to
Max
x1 x'1Ωx1                  (1)
x'1x1 = 1                  (2)
Ω
Where 
Max
x1 x'1Ωx1                  (1)
x'1x1 = 1                  (2)
Ω  represents the sample covariance matrix of a set of variables which are 
denoted by Rt. The solution to this problem (x*'1 Rt x*1) corresponds to the eigenvector 
associated with the largest eigenvalue of 
Max
x1 x'1Ωx1                  (1)
x'1x1 = 1                  (2)
Ω . We denote the scoring factor of each 
characteristic as its respective position in this eigenvector. 
If the linear combination expressed in this eigenvector can explain a represen-
tative fraction of the information of the covariance matrix, then it is possible to just 
use the first principal component in order to assign an appropriate weight to the 
different variables. As a result we can summarize in an effective way the implicit 
information of different characteristics and individuals in a linear form.   
pca methodology has been widely applied in many fields. Commonly, the main 
objective is to construct an aggregate measure combining different characteris-
tics which can be correlated among them. Some pca-based related applications 
are listed for illustrative purposes:  the construction of an index for the quality of 
international universities (Steiner, 2006); households’ wealth indexes for India 
(Filmer and Pritchett, 1998); stock market indexes (Feeney and Hester, 1964); an 
index of credit rating history of loans granted by financial institutions to particu-
lars in Colombia (Murcia, 2007); a composite index to measure economic activi-
ty (frb-Dallas, 2003); a Real Sector Business Confidence Index for Turkey (Ece 
and Hamsici, 2005); an index to measure financial markets’ stress (Amol, 2010); 
a financial stability index for Colombia (Morales and Estrada, 2010) and finan-
cial conditions indexes for different countries (Hatzius et al., 2010; Gómez et al., 
2011), among many others.
pca approach has already been used in the systemic risk literature also. For 
instance, in order to capture the systemic importance of financial institutions in the 
United States, Billio et al. (2010) used this approach to capture the interconnec-
tedness among the monthly returns of hedge funds, banks, brokers, and insurance. 
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Rodriguez-Moreno and Peña (2011) study and compare different systemic risk 
measures for the biggest banks in Europe and the Unites States. They find that 
simple measures based on pca of banks’ credit default swaps (cds) and interbank 
rates performed better than more complicated measures based on structural credit 
risk models (à la Merton, 1974), collateralized debt obligations (cdo) indices and 
their tranches, multivariate densities and co-risk measures. Additionally, De Ca-
denas et al.  (2010) used pca in order to identify and evaluate different sources of 
risk when identifying the systemic nature of an entity. Their analysis shows that 
all considered institutions contribute to systemic risk, albeit to a different degree, 
depending on various risk factors such as size, inter-connection, unsubstitutability, 
balance sheet and risk quality. 
Maybe the most important work on systemic risk under pca approach is Kritz-
man et al.  (2010). Their work studied the statistical properties and association of 
a big set of financial assets. In this paper they introduced a very useful concept 
called “absorption ratio” as a measure of financial fragility. This ratio is defined as 
the proportion of variance which is explained by a finite number of eigenvectors. 
In the words of the authors: “A high value for the absorption ratio corresponds to a 
high level of systemic risk, because it implies the sources of risk are more unified. 
A low absorption ratio indicates less systemic risk, because it implies the sources 
of risk are more disparate”. Kritzman et al. (2010) stress the fact that scenarios 
with high systemic risk do not necessarily lead to asset depreciation or financial 
turbulence; it could be simply an indication of market fragility since a shock is more 
likely to propagate quickly and broadly when sources of risk are tightly coupled.
However, to the knowledge of the authors, this methodology has not been used 
in order to evaluate the systematic importance for financial institutions in Colom-
bia, nor to a combination of metrics for size, connectedness and substitutability. 
The basic idea is to combine appropriately the characteristics that the literature has 
identified as the determinants of systemic importance, and then to construct a pca-
based index using the scoring factors of the first principal component. The value 
of the index would allow for ranking different financial institutions according to 
their systemic importance.
3. pca model for identifying systemic importance
Based on the basic concepts introduced in the previous section, and based on the 
metrics designed by León and Machado (2013) following criteria defined by imf et 
O D E O N  N º  7
139
pp. 125-165 • N.º 7 / 2012-2013
al. (2009) and Manning et al. (2009), this section introduces the authors’ proposal 
for designing a pca-based Systemic Importance Index.
3.1. The inputs
According to recent literature on systemic importance for financial institutions 
and payment systems (imf et al., 2009; Manning et al., 2009), the most relevant 
criteria are size, connectedness and substitutability, where the first two relate to 
their potential to have a large negative impact on the financial system and the real 
economy, whereas the latter relates to the magnitude of the indirect impact. 
Consequently, based on León and Machado (2013), the authors define four key 
indicators that aim to capture size, connectedness and substitutability, as exhibi-
ted in Table 1. Concurrent with imf et al. (2009), the authors embrace the amount 
of financial services each institution provides to the system as a metric for size, 
with standard balance sheet data such as (i) volume of deposits and money market 
borrowing, and (ii) financial assets under management. The first one is intended 
to capture market exposure to credit institutions while the second captures market 
exposure to asset management institutions. 
Concerning connectedness and substitutability the authors agree with recent 
literature that calls for network theory (ecb, 2010) as a way to gain a better unders-
tanding of the financial system. However, unlike standard application of network 
theory, the authors avoid using balance sheet data as the input for such proposal, 
and decide to use data from the large-value payment system as the primary source 
of information for assessing both criteria; this is also the choice of various authors 
for analyzing how financial institutions interact with each other (León and Ma-
chado, 2011; Leon et al., 2011; Machado et al., 2010; Cepeda, 2008; Soramäki et 
al., 2006; Bech and Garrat, 2006; Ianoka et al., 2004). 
As suggested by León and Machado (2013) and León et al. (2011), using large-
value payment system data has several advantages for assessing connectedness and 
substitutability: (i) it is not clear whether off-balance positions are being captured 
or not when using claims, whilst payments comprise all transactions between pa-
yments system’s participants; (ii) unlike claims, relying on payments allows for 
considering liquidity as a key factor in systemic risk; (iii) as emphasized by Kodres 
(2009), failure or insolvency are not the only sources of systemic shocks, but mere 
failure-to-pay or non-payment of transactions can gridlock the entire financial sys-
tem; and (iv) as acknowledged by Tumpel-Gugerell (2009), a particular institution 
might not only be systemically relevant because other institutions are financially 
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exposed to it via balance sheet positions, but also because other market participants 
rely on the continued provision of its services.
It is important to emphasize that the choice of broad key indicators follows 
several considerations. First and most important, broad key indicators allow for 
assessing systemic importance of banking and non-banking financial institutions. 
Unlike most models on assessing systemic importance, which are focused on 
banking institutions (as in bcbs-bis (2011)), the authors consider imperative to be 
able to consider non-banking institutions as relevant as banking institutions; as 
non-banking-related systemic events have demonstrated (e.g. ltcm, Lehman, aig, 
Bear Sterns, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae), and as put forward by Ötker-Robe 
et al. (2011), it is essential to improve the understanding of the shadow banking 
system to prevent non-banking institutions from gaining systemic importance in 
an unnoticed manner.10
Second, broad key indicators allow for a parsimonious model, which would 
allow for continuous (e.g. monthly) monitoring of systemic importance. Third, 
broad key indicators are convenient for comparing results across different finan-
cial systems.
table 1. systemic importance key indicators
 Key indicators Description Source /  Estimation
Rationale
(When facing a failing  
or near failing institution…) 
[A] 
Volume of 
deposits and 
money market 
borrowing
Face value of liabilities 
a financial institution 
would fail to pay to the 
public and to other par-
ticipants of the financial 
system in the short run.
Balance sheet data provided by 
the Financial Superintendence 
of Colombia.
… the larger the deposits and 
money market borrowing… 
 - the larger the potential loss in 
confidence of the public.
 - the larger the potential impact 
on other institutions’ liquidity 
and solvency. 
 - the larger the potential mone-
tary impact of central bank’s 
liquidity supply to affected 
financial institutions.   
10 However each key indicator may be broken down into other –more specific- key indicators; 
as the consultative document by the bcbs-bis (2011) suggests. Nevertheless, such decomposition 
may result in an implicit preference for assessing systemic importance of some types of finan-
cial institutions (e.g. commercial banks), whilst overlooking others (e.g. brokerage firms, hedge 
funds). Hence, authors suggest to use wide-ranging key indicators when initially implementing 
the proposed model, and subsequently increasing their specificity if necessary.
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 Key indicators Description Source /  Estimation
Rationale
(When facing a failing  
or near failing institution…) 
[B]
Volume of 
financial 
assets under 
management
Market value of proprie-
tary assets that may be 
sold in order to obtain 
liquidity in the short run, 
and the volume of assets 
from third parties which 
could be compromised 
or mismanaged in the 
short run in case of a 
failure or near failure.
Balance sheet data provided by 
the Financial Superintendence 
of Colombia.
… the larger the volume of 
financial assets under mana-
gement…
 - the larger the potential impact 
on liquidity and solvency of 
other financial institutions via 
“liquidity spirals”.*
 - the larger the potential im-
pact on the real economy via 
market prices and portfolios’ 
mismanagement.
 - the larger the potential mone-
tary impact of central bank’s 
liquidity supply to affected 
financial institutions.  
[C]
Contribution 
to the payment 
system
Contribution to the total 
payments of the large-
value payment system, 
weighted by the contri-
bution to the total con-
nections of the large-
value payment system 
(cud).  
Large-value payments system 
statistics provided by Banco de 
la República (cud). 
… the larger the volume of 
payments and the number of 
connections…
 - the larger the number of po-
tential institutions affected 
and the severity of the affec-
tedness. 
 - the larger the potential dis-
ruption in the money, capital 
and exchange markets.
 - the larger the potential mone-
tary impact of central bank’s 
liquidity supply to affected 
financial institutions.  
[D]
Betweenness 
centrality
Degree of involvement 
of a participant in the 
–indirect- connection 
of all other participants 
within the large-value 
payment system (cud). 
Estimated as the change in the 
average number of links neces-
sary for each participant to be 
connected to all other partici-
pants; if removing an institution 
results in a major (minor or nil) 
increase in the average number 
of links all institutions require to 
remain connected as before, the 
removed institution is to be con-
sidered as of low (high) substitu-
tability.**  Data provided by cud. 
… the larger the betweenness 
centrality… 
 - the higher the potential effi-
ciency and safety losses for 
the system. 
 - the larger the potential dis-
ruption in the money, capital 
and exchange markets.
Source: León and Machado (2013)
* “Liquidity spirals” refers to the internal amplifying process whereby a falling asset leads to more sales (deleveraging), 
which further drives down asset prices, financial intermediaries’ profit and loss statements, and balance sheets’ net worth 
(Brunnermeier et al. 2009).
** Refer to Exhibit A for a brief introduction to the measurement of connectedness and betweenness centrality.
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Under the size, substitutability and connectedness criteria proposed by imf et 
al. (2009) and Manning et al. (2009), the authors consider size is to be captured 
directly by key indicators [A] and [B], and indirectly by [C]; connectedness is to 
be captured directly by [C], and indirectly by [D]; and substitutability is to be cap-
tured directly by key indicator [D], and indirectly by [C] (Table 2).
table 2. How the selected key indicators  
of systemic importance relate to criteria  
from imf et al. (2009) and manning et al. (2009)
Key indicators
Criteria to be captured
Size Connectedness Substitutability
[A] Volume of deposits 
and money market 
borrowing
[B] Volume of financial 
assets under management
[C] Contribution to the 
payment system
     
[D] Betweenness centrality
directly captured     
Indirectly captured    
Non-captured
Source: León and Machado (2013).
Moreover, as presented in Table 3, the four systemic importance key indicators con-
cur with the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
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table 3. How the selected key indicators of systemic importance  
relate to criteria from the 2010 dodd-Frank Wall street Reform  
and Consumer protection act.
Key indicators
Criteria to be captured
Aggregate 
monetary value of 
transactions
Aggregate exposure 
to counterparties
Interdependencies 
and interactions 
with other 
participants
Effect on 
critical markets, 
institutions and the 
system
[A] Volume of deposits 
and money market 
borrowing
[B] Volume of 
financial assets under 
management
[C] Contribution to the 
payment system
[D] Betweenness 
centrality
directly captured     
Indirectly captured
Non-captured
Source: León and Machado (2013).
The Dodd-Frank Act considers that a financial market utility or payment, clearing 
or settlement activity may be labeled as systemically important under the following 
four considerations11: (i) the aggregate monetary value of its transactions, which 
is to be directly captured by key indicator [C], and indirectly by [A] and [B]; (ii) 
its aggregate exposure of their counterparties, which is to be directly captured by 
key indicator [A], and indirectly by [C]; (iii) its relationship, interdependences, 
or other interactions with other participants, which is to be directly captured by 
key indicators [D] and [C], and indirectly by [A]; (iv) the effect that its failure or 
its disruption would have on critical markets, financial institutions, or the broader 
11 The Dodd-Frank Act does not limit the considerations to these four; the Act includes a fifth, 
which states that any other factors may be included because of their relevance.  
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financial system, which is to be directly captured mainly by [A], [B] and [C], and 
indirectly by [D].
3.2. Testing the inputs’ relevance for identifying systemic importance 
The proposed model consists of evaluating the relative characteristics of each fi-
nancial institution within the Colombian financial system, where the key inputs 
consist of the four key indicators previously presented (A, B, C, D). 
Let A, B, C, D be the systemic importance key indicators as defined and des-
cribed in Table 1; 
SII y
α A= f y Bf y Cf y
x
f y xf y
× A
α
× B
α
× C
α
Df y × D
α
+ + +
 the pca’s scoring factor or coefficients of the first principal 
component for key indicator x, for month y; and λy the fraction of the total variance 
of the y-month panel that is explained by using the first component of the chosen 
key indicators. The main results are the following:12
table 4. scoring factors (may, June, July, 2011)
SII y
α A= f y Bf y Cf y
x
f y xf y
× A
α
× B
α
× C
α
Df y × D
α
+ + +
y = May y = June y = July Mean
x = A 0.561 0.521 0.647 0.576
x = B 0.173 0.150 0.233 0.185
x = C 0.767 0.625 0.717 0.703
x = D 0.259 0.561 0.114 0.311
λy 59.2% 56.5% 50.2% 55.3%
Source: authors’ calculations.
According to the results, (i) all the scoring factors pertaining to the first component 
of the model are different from zero; (ii) the scoring factors pertaining to the first 
component are able to explain more than 50% of the variance of the key indicators; 
(iii) on average the contribution to the payment system [C] (i.e. connectedness) is 
the most important key indicator, followed by the volume of deposits and money 
market borrowing [A], the betweenness centrality [D] and the volume of financial 
assets under  [B]. 
In addition, one important fact is that the fraction of the total variance of the 
y-month panel that is explained by using the chosen key indicators is decreasing 
12 The four attainable components are presented and briefly discussed in Exhibit B. 
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in these months suggesting a decreasing component of aggregate systemic risk. 
Using the notion of “absorption ratio” proposed by Kritzman et al. (2010), when 
this proportion is decreasing, it could be an indication of decreasing market 
fragility since the sources of systemic risk considered were less coupled13. It is 
important to remember that a financial or macro shock is more likely to propa-
gate quickly and broadly when the sources of systemic risk are highly correlated.
If the first component’s scoring factors are squared (
SII y
α A= f y Bf y Cf y
x
f y xf y
× A
α
× B
α
× C
α
Df y × D
α
+ + +
)2 and since by defi-
nition the sum of squared score factors must be equal to one, the results may be 
interpreted as each key indicator’s explanatory share or weight. Table 5 exhibits 
wxy, which corresponds to the weight of key indicator x, for month y.
table 5. Key indicators’ weights (may, June, July, 2011)
wxy = (
SII y
α A= f y Bf y Cf y
x
f y xf y
× A
α
× B
α
× C
α
Df y × D
α
+ + +
) y = May y = June y = July Mean
x = A 0.315 0.280 0.378 0.332
x = B 0.029 0.081 0.136 0.034
x = C 0.588 0.337 0.419 0.494
x = D 0.068 0.302 0.067 0.097
Source: authors’ calculations.
As before, for the three months analyzed, the most important key indicator is the 
contribution to the payment system [C] (i.e. connectedness), which on average 
explains by itself around 25% of the variance of the key indicators, followed by 
the volume of deposits and money market borrowing [A]. In this sense, the results 
confirm the importance of the too-connected-to-fail criteria as the main determinant 
of relative systemic importance within the Colombian financial system (as in León 
and Machado, 2011), where institution’s size is also an important determinant, but 
secondary to connectedness. 
13 From a statistical perspective, the main logic of Kritzman (2010) is based on the fact that in 
the presence of a coupled behavior among variables, it is natural to observe that a large proportion 
of the variance can be explained with a linear combination of these variables (i.e first principal 
component). In the case of the presence of uncoupled movements, a bigger number of orthogonal 
linear combinations should be needed to explain the same proportion of the variance.
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4. Systemic importance assessment14 
Based on the pca approach to obtaining an index, this section uses May, June and 
July 2011 data to calculate the individual systemic importance of the financial 
institutions participating in Colombia’s large-value payment system (cud). During 
these three months the average of financial institutions directly participating in the 
cud was 147, classified as in Table 6.15
Each financial institution’s systemic importance key indicator was estimated 
according to Table 1. Indicators [A], [B] were obtained from statistical data from 
the Banking Superintendence of Colombia. [C] and [D] were obtained based on 
large-value payment system’s databases (Banco de la República-cud), and calcu-
lated as described in Exhibit A. 
table 6. main Colombian market’s financial institutions directly  
participating in cud (as of may 2011)d
Class Institution type Main purpose c
Credit 
Institutions
(ci) a
Commercial Bank (cb) Provision of deposit and loans, including mortgages. [21]
Commercial Financial 
Corporation (cfc)
Provision of deposit and loans focused on goods and services commercial-
ization (e.g. leasing). [20]
Financial Corporation (cf) Provision of deposit and loans focused on medium term industrial financ-ing; akin to an investment bank. [3]
Non-Credit 
Institutitons
(nci)
Mutual Fund (mf) Provision of investment vehicles with the purpose of investing in securities and other assets according to the risk profile of the investor. [27]
Brokerage Firm (bf) Provision of brokerage services with the purpose of buying and selling securi-ties (e.g. stocks, bonds, currencies); allowed to trade for its own account. [26]
Pension Fund Manager (pfm) Provision of investment vehicles with the purpose of investing for retire-ment. [6]
Other b Insurance companies, financial cooperatives and other.  [18]
a Financial cooperatives pertain to Credit Institutions; due to their low contribution to the cud and their size they were included in the 
“Other” class; CIs are the only institutions able to receive last-resort lending liquidity. 
b The “Other” class gathers financial institutions characterized by their particularly low (or nil) relevance for the key systemic impor-
tance indicators. 
c  Only the main differencing feature appears; the number of institutions as of May 2011 appears in brackets. 
d Financial infrastructures and official financial institutions are excluded from this Table and were not analyzed.   
Source: León et al. (2011).
14 Results are illustrative. They may not be used to infer credit quality or to make any type of 
assessment for any financial institution. Results do not represent an opinion or statement of Banco 
de la República nor of its Board of Directors. The name of each institution is not revealed due to 
disclosure restrictions.
15 For a brief introduction to the functioning and characteristics of the Colombian large-value 
payments system (cud), refer to Banco de la República (2011), León et al. (2011), Machado et al. 
(2010) or Cepeda (2008). 
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Following the methodology for constructing indexes in the literature under 
pca approach, let 
SII y
α A= f y Bf y Cf y
x
f y xf y
× A
α
× B
α
× C
α
Df y × D
α
+ + +
 be the coefficient from the first principal component of vari-
ance covariance matrix of systemic characteristics for key indicator x, for month 
y (as in Table 4), the Systemic Importance Indicator for a α-financial institution 
(SII y
α A= f y Bf y Cf y
x
f y xf y
× A
α
× B
α
× C
α
Df y × D
α
+ + +) will be calculated as the standardized value (i.e. in a 0 to 10 scale) of the 
expression (3)
SII y
α A= f y Bf y Cf y
x
f y xf y
× A
α
× B
α
× C
α
Df y × D
α
+ + +      (3)  
It is worth emphasizing that the Index provides a relative assessment of each 
institution’s systemic importance16. Therefore, an Index equal to zero does not 
correspond to the –absolute- absence of systemic importance for that institution, 
but a negligible importance with respect to the most important institution.
Table 7 exhibits the top-ten Systemic Importance Indicator for the three chosen 
periods; due to disclosure restrictions the name of the institution is replaced by its 
type according to Table 6, and a distinctive number. 
Regarding these results, three comments are worth making. First, the types 
which concentrate most systemic importance in the Colombian financial market 
are commercial banks (CBs) and brokerage firms (BFs), as in León and Machado 
(2013), León et al. (2011) and Machado et al. (2010). Second, the indexes com-
prise twelve financial institutions, where eight appear every month, two appear in 
two months, and two appear in just one of them. Third, a single participant (CB1) 
resulted as the most systemically important financial institution every month, with 
CB1, CB2, CB3, CB5 ranking in the top-five every month.
16 The proposed measure is relative in terms of a comparison for a group of financial institu-
tions for each observation in time. The score of 10 for each observation is obtained by the most 
important systemic institution.
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table 7
systemic Importance Index 
(top-ten financial institutions)
Rank
May June July Mean
Institution Index Institution Index Institution Index Institution Index
1 CB1* 10,0 CB1* 10,0 CB1* 10,0 CB1* 10,0
2 CB2* 8,1 CB4* 9,2 CB4* 8,5 CB4* 8,5
3 CB3* 8,0 CB9 7,8 CB2* 8,5 CB2* 8,1
4 CB4* 7,9 CB2* 7,7 CB3* 8,0 CB3* 7,8
5 BF1* 7,7 CB3* 7,5 CB5* 6,9 BF1* 6,9
6 BF2* 7,5 CB10 6,8 BF1* 6,8 BF2* 6,9
7 CB5* 6,6 BF2* 6,6 BF2* 6,6 CB5* 6,6
8 CB6* 6,1 BF1* 6,3 CB8 6,5 CB9 6,3
9 CB7 6,0 CB5* 6,3 CB6* 6,5 CB6* 6,1
10 CB8 5,8 CB6* 5,6 CB9 6,2 CB8 5,8
(*) Institutions appearing in the three months analyzed.
Source: authors’ calculations.
Because the key indicators’ data are the same as in León and Machado (2013), 
CBs emerge as particularly important due to their volume of deposits and money 
market borrowing, along with their contribution to the large-value payment sys-
tem (cud). The two brokerage firms (BFs) appearing in the top-ten rank convey 
systemic importance because of their particularly high contribution to the large-
value payment system.
It is also important to highlight that network theory based on payment system 
data allowed the identification of those two BFs as systemically important due 
to their connectedness. This is not the result of financial system’s balance sheet 
being exposed to BFs, but the result of the financial system relying on these BFs’ 
continuous provision of their services; those two BFs’ systemic importance would 
have been missed using network theory based on traditional balance sheet data.     
Concurrent with León and Machado (2013), an important attribute of the Sys-
temic Importance Index is its high level of skewness (Figure 2). Such skewness 
confirms the intuition regarding the high degree of asymmetry (right skew) of 
systemic importance, where the average institution is of low systemic importance 
and the average default or failure-to-pay results in low systemic severity; thus, 
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relying on the systemic importance of the average financial institution would 
divert financial authorities from its aim of ever preserving financial stability and 
payment systems safety. 
Figure 2. distribution of the systemic Importance Index
Source: authors’ calculations.
5. Final remarks
The most recent episode of global market turmoil exposed the limitations resulting 
from institution-centric metrics and the –resulting- traditional focus on too-big-
to-fail institutions within an increasingly systemic-crisis-prone financial system. 
This has encouraged the appearance of the too-connected-to-fail concept, and has 
resulted in the emergence of several challenges regarding the estimation of finan-
cial institutions’ systemic importance by financial authorities. 
As previously documented, the main challenges relate to (i) designing measu-
res corresponding to size, substitutability and connectedness, and (ii) choosing a 
methodology capable of robustly aggregating the metrics designed for the three 
aforementioned concepts. 
Despite the intricacy of the first challenge, there are data sources and methodo-
logies that may overcome some of the difficulties. Vis-à-vis data sources, unlike 
traditional balance sheet data, financial infrastructure data are particularly dyna-
mic and granular and may help to identify the type, volume and risk profile of the 
activities and services provided by each type of institution, even at the firm level 
(Uribe, 2011b). Concerning methodologies, network theory has emerged as an 
interesting and comprehensive approach to effectively assess financial institu-
tions’ connectedness and substitutability, as suggested by ecb (2010) and Uribe 
(2011a,b). Together, financial infrastructures’ data (i.e. large-value payment sys-
tems) and network theory, are supported by literature (Leon et al., 2011; Machado 
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et al., 2010; Cepeda, 2008; Soramäki et al., 2006; Bech and Garrat, 2006; Ianoka 
et al., 2004) as a convenient approach to better approximate the way financial ins-
titutions interact with each other. 
Regarding the second challenge, the choice of an aggregating method for the 
metrics capturing size, connectedness and substitutability is an ongoing topic. Each 
proposal has its own advantages and disadvantages, and each provides a valuable 
input for financial authorities. 
In the case in hand, because of consisting of a different –purely quantitative- ap-
proach, the results from this paper serve the purpose of accompanying the –quanti-
tative and qualitative- outcome of León and Machado (2013). Both methodologies 
should be regarded as complementary, and their outcomes should not be regarded 
as substitutes for sound judgment by financial authorities, or the only metrics to 
use when deciding the systemic importance of a financial institution.    
Akin to León and Machado (2013) results based on expert knowledge, results 
obtained by the pca-based proposed methodology are straightforward and grant 
financial authorities with the ability to acquire a comprehensive relative assessment 
of each financial institution’s systemic importance. Both approaches share the ad-
vantages of providing a parsimonious and straightforward cardinal classification of 
financial institutions, which would allow for convenient continuous (e.g. monthly) 
monitoring of systemic importance, and for the ability to capture the dynamics of 
the financial market.
Unlike León and Machado, the pca-based approach is able to (i) quantitati-
vely test the significance of each metric for differentiating systemic importance 
within financial institutions, (ii) provide observable weights for the index, and 
(iii) estimate useful statistics such as the absorption ratio proposed by Kritzman 
et al. (2010) as a proxy of aggregate systemic risk. Unfortunately, this advantage 
comes at non-trivial costs: (i) the impossibility of capturing non-linearities in the 
aggregation of key indicators17 and (ii) ignoring imf et al. (2009) recommendations 
about the importance of expert judgment and qualitative inputs. This reinforces 
the authors’ belief regarding the convenience of developing different approaches 
with a complementary view.
17 As aforementioned, each principal component corresponds to a linear combination of the 
inputs or metrics. Thus, non-linear effects arising from progressively concentrating systemic im-
portance factors within a single institution (akin to an anti-diversification effect, as described in 
León and Machado (2013)) may not be captured by this pca-based proposal. 
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About the results, despite the difference between both aggregation approaches, 
the purely quantitative pca-based Systemic Importance Index supports or confirms 
León and Machado (2013) main findings with their quantitative and qualitative 
Fuzzy Logic-based Systemic Importance Index. For instance, (i) the three concepts 
and their metrics are explanatory and non-redundant for differentiating financial 
institutions’ relative systemic importance; (ii) connectedness is the single most 
important input, followed by size and substitutability, in that order; (iii) Commer-
cial Banks are the most systemically important financial institution in the Colom-
bian case; (iv) some local non-banking institutions (i.e Brokerage Firms), despite 
being insignificant by the balance sheet exposure they engender, are systemically 
important because of their role within the local financial system.
Regarding the usage of the pca-based Systemic Importance Index, financial 
authorities are to decide whether an important/unimportant threshold is to be de-
fined within the index. Although the authors consider that defining such threshold 
is intricate and outside the scope of this document, they suggest considering (i) 
the purpose of defining the threshold (e.g. for defining a capital charge or deciding 
which institutions to follow closely); (ii) the degree of clustering of the Index (i.e. its 
skewness); and (iii) a detailed knowledge of the functioning of the financial system. 
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7. Exhibit A: Assessing connectedness and 
substitutability with network analysis basics
As explained throughout the document, literature recognizes three criteria as key 
to measuring and identifying systemic importance: size, connectedness and subs-
titutability (imf et al., 2009; Manning et al., 2009). Because of their novelty and 
intricacy, the first two sections of this exhibit briefly describe the methodologies 
imported from network analysis in order to measure connectedness and substitu-
tability19, where the third section displays some results obtained with the described 
methodologies.  
In order to make this exhibit comprehensible it is worth acknowledging the 
following concepts (Table A1), which pertain to network analysis terminology.  
table a1. network analysis basic terminology
Term Description
Vertex The fundamental unit of a network. Also referred to as node, actor or participant.
Edge The line connecting two vertices. Also referred to as bond, link or tie. It may be directed if it runs in only one direction or undirected if it runs in both directions. 
Degree The number of edges connected to a vertex. In-degree (out-degree) refers to the number of incoming (outgoing) edges. 
Geodesic path
It is the shortest path through the network from one vertex to another. Note that there may 
be more than one geodesic path between two vertices, and that in a directed network the 
geodesic path may be different from one vertex to another and its reverse.
Distance
The number of links that is minimally needed to connect two vertices. Neighbors (di-
rectly connected) have distance equal to 1; neighbors of neighbors that are not directly 
connected are at distance 2, and so forth. 
Source: authors’ design, based on Buechel and Buskens (2008) and Newman (2003).
In Figure A1 the previous concepts could be applied as follows: the graph 
consists of seven vertices or nodes (i.e. A, B, C, D, E, F, G), where the A node is 
19 Network analysis provides many other metrics and measures related to centrality. This exhibit 
focuses on the approach chosen by the authors. For a comprehensive review and explanation of 
alternative metrics and measures refer to Newman (2010). 
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connected to nodes E and D via two undirected edges20 (i.e. incoming/outgoing 
from/to E and D); thus, the in-degree and out-degree of A is two. There are two 
geodesic paths from nodes A to G, consisting of three edges (i.e. the path A-D-F-
G and the path A-E-F-G). 
Figure a1. a simple undirected network
Source: authors’ design
7.1. Connectedness
The main intuition of the connectedness criteria asserts that the larger the number 
–and volume- of the links an institution maintains with other market participants, 
the larger the contagion or spillovers it may generate; this is, the systemic impor-
tance of a financial institution generally increases with its degree of connectedness. 
According to Newman (2010) and de Nooy et al. (2005), the simplest centrality 
measure in a network is the degree of a vertex; this is, the number of edges con-
nected to it, or the number of its neighbors. This type of centrality metric assesses 
how intensely the vertex is connected to the network, which relates in our case to 
how easily can payments arrive to or spread from that vertex. For example, in Fi-
gure A1 the most central vertex (i.e. with most edges) is D, which has five of them.
It is common to find that the degree of each vertex is normalized with respect 
to the highest degree attainable. Let n be the number of vertices in a network, 
20 Because network analysis is to be applied to payments, where each payment is necessarily 
related to an immediate, previous or forthcoming transfer of a financial asset (e.g. a bond, a stock, 
money, etc.), note that directed edges (i.e. with only one direction) will not be considered. 
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and  ED the degree of vertex D, then (n – 1) is the highest degree attainable, then 
the degree centrality of vertex D (CD) may be expressed as in (4). Note that if a 
vertex is connected to all the other vertices of the network its degree centrality 
will equal 1, whilst an isolated vertex (not connected to the network) will yield a 
degree centrality equal to 0. 
CD =
ED
Wj
WjΣj=1
Vj =
Kj = Cj  × Vj
N-1
N
j
Bj = Σpq Gpq
∀Gpq
Gpq
,  0, p  j, q  j, p  q
      (4)
Therefore, because of its documented simplicity and usefulness, the authors rely 
on degree centrality as a customary metric for connectedness. Nevertheless, de-
gree centrality of a vertex or node would suffice to assess its centrality only if all 
edges are judged as equally important; this is the standard case of network analysis 
applied to social relations or informational networks. In the case in hand, where 
edges represent payments, it is convenient to recognize the importance of each 
edge according to the value of the payments it intends to represent.
Consequently, as in other applications of network analysis21, it is important to 
consider each edge’s strength, weight or value. Let Figure A2 be a weighted version of 
Figure A1, where each edge’s number represents the weight of the connection between 
the vertices. It is rather evident that vertex D remains as the most important regarding 
the weight of the edges it shares with other vertices, with weights adding up to 13. 
Figure a2. a weighted network
Source: authors’ design
21 A common case of weighted networks is the bandwidth or the amount of data flowing between 
nodes within the world wide web (Newman, 2010). 
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Considering the edges’ weights provides new information that was not apparent 
when using degree centrality. Vertices B and C in Figure A1 appear to be equally 
central, both with two undirected edges, both sharing connections between them-
selves and to vertex D; moreover, when calculating the degree centrality as in (4), 
B and C yield the same result (EB / (n – 1) = EC / (n – 1) = 2/6 = 0.33). Despite 
sharing the same degree centrality, it is rather clear in Figure B2 that considering 
weights would signal vertex B as being more intensely connected than vertex C, 
with weights equal to 6 and 3, respectively. 
Analogous to degree centrality, the authors normalize the total weight of each 
vertex with respect to the sum of each vertex’s edge weight.22 Let Wj represent the 
total weigh of all the edges of vertex j, each vertex’s share of the network’s weight 
(Vj) may be expressed as in (5).
CD =
ED
Wj
WjΣj=1
Vj =
Kj = Cj  × Vj
N-1
N
j
Bj = Σpq Gpq
∀Gpq
Gpq
,  0, p  j, q  j, p  q
     (5)
Vertex D, which displays the most weight, yields a 0.342 share of the network’s 
weight. Calculating B’s and C’s share of the network’s weight would yield 0.158 
and 0.079, respectively, avoiding considering B and C as equally important within 
the network because of exhibiting the same number of edges. Unfortunately, com-
paring B’s and F’s share of the network’s weight (both 0.158) would consider these 
two vertices as equally important to the network despite F has one more neighbor 
than B.   
Because both approaches to assessing the intensity of the connection are valua-
ble for the case in hand (i.e. payments), where the systemic importance increases 
with the number of connected institutions and with the share of the total payments, 
the authors use the product23 of both metrics as an overall measure of the contri-
bution to the payment system (Kj), as in (6):
22 Note that the calculation of  Vj as in (5) counts the weights separately in either direction be-
tween each vertex pair, which results in counting each weigh twice. As pointed out by Newman 
(2010), it is possible to compensate for this double-counting by dividing each weight by 2; never-
theless it makes little difference since the analysis focuses on the relative magnitudes and not the 
absolute values. Moreover, this notation allows for applying (5) to directed networks as well.  
23 Note that multiplying both metrics (i.e. the degree centrality and the share of the network’s 
total weight) is analogous to using the AND –conjunction- operator in Fuzzy Logic (Cox, 1994). 
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CD =
ED
Wj
WjΣj=1
Vj =
Kj = Cj  × Vj
N-1
N
j
Bj = Σpq Gpq
∀Gpq
Gpq
,  0, p  j, q  j, p  q
     (6)
Based on Figure A2, the result of employing such approach is presented in Table 
A2, where Kj corresponds to the j-vertex overall contribution to the network, and 
Kindexj corresponds to the standardized value of Kj in a 0 to 10 scale.24
It is worth noticing that (i) the vertex most contributing to the network is D, 
receiving the highest score in the 0 to 10 scale, which is intuitive since is the vertex 
with most connections and with the highest share of the network’s weight; (ii) the 
vertex less contributing to the network is G, receiving the lowest score; (iii) verti-
ces B and C are no longer deemed as equally important as with degree centrality 
alone, where B is more important than C because of the latter’s edges weights; and 
(iv) vertices B and F are no longer deemed as equally important as with the share 
to the network’s total weight, where F is more important than B because of the 
former’s number of edges . Hence, as displayed in Table A2, using the product of 
both metrics allows for comprehensively and intuitively assessing the importance 
of the network’s vertices. 
table a2. Contribution to the network
Vertex Cj Vj Kj Kindexj
A 0,3333 0,1053 0,0351 1,2
B 0,3333 0,1579 0,0526 1,8
C 0,3333 0,0789 0,0263 0,9
D 0,8333 0,3421 0,2851 10,0
E 0,5000 0,1053 0,0526 1,8
F 0,5000 0,1579 0,0789 2,8
G 0,1667 0,0526 0,0088 0,3
           Source: authors’ calculations
If a vertex displays both a high (low) level of centrality AND a high (low) level of contribution to 
the network’s total weight, then the product of both levels will be high (low).   
24 As previously introduced (footnote 14), this standardization procedure assigns the maximum 
index value (10) to the most contributing vertex, and the rest is assigned an index value by means 
of linear interpolation. Such standardization is straightforward and makes comparisons and cal-
culations easier.
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7.2. Substitutability
The severity of the impact of a payment system failure, and hence the extent of 
systemic risk, depends critically on whether substitutes are readily available to 
allow payment flows to be rerouted via another system (Manning et al. 2009). Con-
sequently, the systemic importance of a financial institution generally decreases 
with its degree of substitutability. 
A key concept for assessing substitutability comes from network analysis’ 
betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality measures the brokerage role of a 
certain vertex within a network (Buechel and Buskens, 2008) or, as defined by de 
Nooy et al. (2005), it captures the extent to which a vertex is needed as a link in 
the chain of contacts that facilitate the spread of information within a network; the 
more a vertex is a go-between, the more central its position in the network.
The calculation of betweenness centrality relies on the geodesic path concept, 
which is the shortest path through the network from one vertex to another. It is 
calculated for vertex j as the proportion of all geodesic paths between pairs of other 
vertices that include such vertex (de Nooy et al., 2005). Let Gpq be the number of 
geodesic paths between vertices p and q, and 
CD =
ED
Wj
WjΣj=1
Vj =
Kj = Cj  × Vj
N-1
N
j
Bj = Σpq Gpq
∀Gpq
Gpq
,  0, p  j, q  j, p  q
 the number of geodesic paths 
between p and q that go through vertex , betweenness centrality of vertex j (Bj) is 
calculated as in (7):
CD =
ED
Wj
WjΣj=1
Vj =
Kj = Cj  × Vj
N-1
N
j
Bj = Σpq Gpq
∀Gpq
Gpq
,  0, p  j, q  j, p  q        (7)
Nevertheless, because substitutability is related to the severity of the impact of a 
vertex being removed, which depends on whether substitutes are readily available 
to allow preserving the distances between vertices, betweenness centrality by itself 
fails to address this criteria in a proper manner. Betweenness centrality captures 
the importance of a vertex as an intermediary between all the others vertices that 
compose the network, but it does not capture the severity of the impact resulting 
from the removal of a vertex. 
Because substitutability relates to the severity of the impact for the geodesic 
path between vertices p and q (Gpq) resulting from the removal of a j-vertex, which 
could be conveniently defined in terms of distance between the remaining vertices, 
consider that there are three possible scenarios resulting from removing j from the 
network: (i) there is no change in the distance corresponding to the geodesic path 
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between vertices p and q (Gpq ) because other vertex or vertices could substitute 
the removed j-vertex, or because the j-vertex does not pertain to the geodesic path 
(Gpq ); (ii) other vertex or vertices could substitute the removed j-vertex, but with 
an increase in the distance corresponding to the new geodesic path between verti-
ces p and q (Gpq); and (iii) there is no other vertex or vertices which may serve the 
purpose of indirectly connecting vertices p and q, hence there would be no geodesic 
path between them (Gpq  = 0), and the distance between vertices p and q would be 
defined as a number larger than any other possible distance in the network.25 
These three scenarios are depicted in Figure A3. The vertex removed changes 
in each panel of the figure, and the geodesic path to be analyzed is the one corres-
ponding to connecting vertices C and H:
Figure a3
scenarios of substitutability
Geodesic path connecting vertices C and H
Scenario (i) 
Removal of a
no change in distance
Scenario (ii) 
Removal of d
Increase in the distance
Scenario (iii) 
Removal of E
disconnection
Source: authors’ design
In Scenario (i) the impact resulting from the removal of vertex A is nil; the geodesic 
path between C and H (GCH) comprises two vertices (D and E, with a total distance 
of 3), where vertex A is not present. In Scenario (ii) the impact from the removal 
of vertex D is an increase in the distance between C an H, which increases from 
3 to 4 where vertices G, F and E belong to this new geodesic path. Scenario (iii) 
25 Buechel and Buskens (2008) suggest assigning a number larger than any possible actual 
distance in the network for those pairs of vertices that cannot reach each other, and choose to use 
n; this is also the authors’ choice. 
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exhibits the third case, where the removal of vertex E results in the impossibility 
of connecting vertices C and H. 
Consequently, for the relation between vertices C and H, vertex E is not subs-
titutable (i.e. no other vertex or vertices are able to fulfill its role), vertex A is 
not relevant (i.e. the geodesic path does not includes vertex A), and vertex D is 
substitutable but with an increase in the distance between C and H. This result is 
relevant and emphasizes the importance of considering both connectedness and 
substitutability: degree centrality alone would consider Figure A3’s vertex E as 
of lower systemic importance than D (i.e. E has less edges than D), and would not 
recognize that the removal of D does not result in a major disruption in the network 
(i.e. it would be substituted by using other –longer- paths), whilst the removal of 
E would result in a vertex being disconnected from the network.   
Accordingly, the approach chosen by the authors to assess the substitutability 
of each vertex comprising the network consists of an iterative procedure of the 
analysis just described. This is, (i) calculating the average distance of the geo-
desic paths for all the vertices within the network; (ii) removing a vertex from the 
network and recalculating the average distance of the geodesic paths for all the 
vertices within the network; (iii) calculating the increase in the average distance 
of all the geodesic paths after removing the vertex; (iv) repeating these steps for 
all the network’s vertices. 
This procedure will yield each vertex’s effect on the average distance of the 
geodesic paths of the network, which is a distance-based metric for assessing the 
severity of the impact of a vertex being removed, and a useful metric for substitu-
tability. It is expected that (i) removing a perfectly substitutable vertex (i.e. may 
be substituted without increasing the distance of the geodesic paths) will result in a 
constant average distance of the geodesic paths for all vertices within the network; 
(ii) removing a non-perfectly substitutable vertex will result in an increase in the 
average distance of the geodesic paths, whereas the magnitude of the increase is 
negatively related to the substitutability of the vertex; and (iii) removing a non-
substitutable vertex will result in an increase in the average distance of the geodesic 
paths and the disconnection of one or more vertices of the network.
8. Exhibit B: Principal Components Scoring Factors
In this appendix the values of the first principal components of four systemic cha-
racteristics of financial institutions are reported. In addition, the corresponding 
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value of the explained variance by each of the principal components is represented 
by the value of λ, whereas this information is calculated for the three dates consi-
dered in the document. 
Figure B1
Scoring Factors 
(may, June, July, 2011)
May 2011 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4
A 0,56 -0,11 -0,61 -0,55
B 0,17 0,98 -0,02 0,00
C 0,77 -0,12 0,62 0,13
D 0,26 -0,06 -0,50 0,82
λ 59,2% 25,6% 10,2% 5,0%
June 2011 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4
A 0,52 -0,03 -0,15 0,84
B 0,15 0,88 0,45 0,02
C 0,63 0,20 -0,58 -0,49
D 0,56 -0,43 0,66 -0,24
λ 56,5% 21,1% 18,5% 3,9%
July 2011 PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4
A 0,65 -0,18 -0,07 0,74
B 0,23 0,97 0,01 0,03
C 0,72 -0,15 -0,10 -0,67
D 0,11 -0,04 0,99 -0,01
λ 50,2% 24,9% 19,8% 5,2%
Source: authors’ calculations
It is worth mentioning that the first principal component explains more than the 
50% of the variance for the three dates, and that the four first principal components 
together (PC1, PC2, PC3 and PC4) explain 100% of the variance of the sample. 
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The importance of a systemic characteristic such as the volume of financial 
assets under management (factor B) is increased if the second principal compo-
nent is considered; in this component that characteristic presents a high and posi-
tive scoring factor. In the hypothetic case in which the first principal component 
would explain a low proportion of the sample variance, the combination of two or 
more principal components should be used. In that case the characteristic of size 
represented by the volume of financial assets under management would probably 
gain more importance into the systemic index. As in the considered observations 
this is not the case, it is safe to use the first component as an instrument to obtain 
an appropriate weight of this kind of characteristics.
